Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1999

How SEQRA Cases Fared in 1998
Michael B. Gerrard
Columbia Law School, michael.gerrard@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael B. Gerrard, How SEQRA Cases Fared in 1998, N.Y.L.J., JANUARY 22, 1999 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3100

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

January 22, 1999

How SEQRA Cases Fared in 1998
New York Law Journal
By Michael B. Gerrard
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In the annals of the State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA), 1998 should be remembered as the year when developers
throughout New York State became frustrated with what they
perceived as irrational requirements or excessive delays in the
SEQRA process, went to court for redress, and almost uniformly
lost. There were 18 attempts at such relief and one highly mixed
success.
In all, the courts decided 62 cases under SEQRA in 1998 -- close to
the average of 64 since this column began an annual survey in
1991. For the first time since then there were no decisions from the
Court of Appeals, but there was an unprecedented number of
SEQRA cases brought in the federal courts in conjunction with
federal claims (though this approach was also very unsuccessful).
The central requirement of SEQRA is the preparation of an
environmental impact statement (EIS) for discretionary state or
local governmental actions that may significantly affect the
environment. As usual, plaintiffs were more likely to win in 1998
if no EIS had been prepared. Plaintiffs won seven of the 40 cases
(17.5%) where there had been no EIS, and one of the 18 cases (5.5%)
where there had been an EIS. (A few of the decisions did not
indicate whether or not there had been an EIS.)
In 1998 there were 203 positive declarations (rulings that an EIS is
necessary), 183 draft EISs, and 100 final EISs.
Frustrated Applicants
To begin the discussion of 1998's most notable SEQRA development
-- the flood of suits by frustrated applicants -- I will start with the
only such case where the plaintiffs won at all.
In Ernalex Construction Realty Corp. v. Bellissimo , the applicant
sought to build two apartment buildings in Glen Cove. It started
with a proposal for 88 units, but after the city adopted a "Hillside
Protection Ordinance" that restricted use of the site, the applicant
scaled back to 28 units. As required by the city, the applicant
prepared a draft EIS; then a supplemental draft EIS; and then a
final EIS. At the end of the process, the city's Planning Board
denied site-plan approval, and the developer sued. Supreme Court

dismissed the case but the Appellate Division, Second Department,
reversed.
The Second Department found that the "Planning Board's denial of
site-plan approval was largely based on six speculative comments
that ... raised various unsubstantiated environmental issues...
Since the comments submitted to the Planning Board were
uncorroborated by empirical evidence or expert opinion, they were
insufficient to counter the compelling evidence submitted by the
petitioner's experts."
Even this victory had something of a Pyrrhic quality to it,
however. Not only had the applicant been forced to reduce its
project from 88 units to 28, it also suffered through an
extraordinarily long process. It bought the property in 1986,
received a positive declaration in 1988, underwent a scoping
session (a meeting to determine the scope of the EIS) in 1993, was
denied its permit in 1996, and won at the Second Department in
1998. Moreover, the decision remanded the case to the Planning
Board for further proceedings on certain outstanding
environmental issues, so the saga is not yet over.
In all of the other 17 cases where applicants sued, they went down
to unalloyed defeat. In three of these cases the courts expressed
considerable sympathy for the applicant's plight but said they
could do nothing to help. In Honess 52 Corp. v. Town of Fishkill , an
applicant for a residential subdivision went to federal court
alleging that the prolonged and convoluted approval process
amounted to a violation of substantive due process. The court noted
that the town had subjected the applicant to a "prolonged
runaround" but found that the applicant had no property interest
in receiving discretionary permits, and thus federal relief was
unavailable. Instead, the court said the applicant should seek
relief in state court. However, the applicant had sought such relief,
and -- a month before the federal ruling -- had lost there as well.
Likewise, in DLC Management Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park , the
Second Circuit found that "plaintiffs were treated shabbily and
unfairly" by the town but had no "legitimate claim of entitlement"
to the zoning reclassification that they sought. The case was
dismissed after the plaintiffs had spent more than $1 million on
the proposed shopping center project, even though the chair of the
planning board was married to the owner of a competitor of the
project, and other irregularities were found.
The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
(DEC) required an applicant for a mining permit, who had already
prepared an EIS, to undertake a supplemental EIS on whether the
project would adversely affect the timber rattlesnake. The
applicant asked the court to require DEC to decide first whether the
project would have unacceptable noise and visual impacts, so that
he would know if it was worthwhile to spend the several years and

several hundred thousand dollars required for a rattlesnake study.
The court said, given the irrelevance of the rattlesnakes to the
noise and visual issues, DEC's "refusal to issue an interim
determination is arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of
discretion." However, in the court's view, the refusal to issue an
interim decision is not a final determination and thus not subject
to judicial review, and the case was dismissed.
Several other matters presented less sympathetic facts. In four
cases, the applicant failed or refused to submit information
requested by the agencies, but instead insisted on litigating;
unsurprisingly, in all four cases the agencies prevailed.
Courts in several other cases upheld permit denials, or severe
permit conditions, whether issued after the preparation of EISs or
without EISs. A town's insistence on further environmental review
before rendering a final decision on an application was also
upheld.
Telecommunications Towers
Three decisions concerned new telecommunications towers. Those
wishing to site such towers won one of the three.
The case won by cellular telephone companies was Lucas v.
Planning Board of the Town of LaGrange . Bell Atlantic Mobile and
Cellular One had each applied to build separate towers. After
negotiations with the town, they agreed to co-locate on a single
tower. The town then, however, issued a positive declaration under
SEQRA (requiring an EIS) and imposed a moratorium on new
towers. The companies sued the town in federal court on the
grounds that the moratorium and other town actions violated the
Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, which restricts local
authority over such facilities. The court agreed, and a consent
decree was worked out under which the town revoked its positive
declaration and issued permits to the towers. With that, neighbors
of the tower sued the town in state court for (among other things)
violating SEQRA by revoking the positive declaration. The town
removed the suit to federal court. Judge Brieant dismissed the suit,
holding that the consent decree -- which, upon his approval, had
become an action of a court -- was exempt from SEQRA, and that in
any event the procedural requirements of SEQRA had been
preempted by the Telecommunications Act. Judge Brieant went on
to issue a permanent injunction "enjoining plaintiffs, their
successors and assigns and all persons with actual knowledge of
the injunction from challenging in any forum, except on direct
appeal in this case, the validity of the Permits" issued to the tower.
Two other decisions took a different view of the effect of the
Telecommunications Act on SEQRA. In Sprint Spectrum L.P. v.
Willoth , the Town of Ontario required an EIS for three new cellular
towers, and then denied the applications because it felt that one

tower would be sufficient. The federal district court rejected Sprint
Spectrum's argument that the federal statute precluded such a
denial. The statute reserved zoning authority to local
governments, and the Town of Ontario had acted within that
authority in denying the application, the court held.
In Rochester Telephone Mobile Communications v. Ober , the
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, rejected a challenge to a
positive declaration on the grounds that it was not a final
determination that could be challenged in an Article 78
proceeding.
It should also be noted that 1998 saw a rash of SEQRA cases
brought in federal court -- nine decisions in all -- but, with the sole
exception of Lucas, every one of them was dismissed. The seven
brought by project applicants have already been discussed. The two
brought by project opponents fared no better; the federal causes of
action were found to lack merit, and the pendent state claims were
then dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Standing
As in some prior years, the defense that petitioners lacked
standing to sue succeeded in several cases. A number of courts
found that plaintiffs, especially environmental groups or their
individual members, would not be adversely affected by an action
in a way that differed from the public at large, and therefore they
could not sue, or (in the case of businesses) that the only real
adverse effect would be economic, which does not fall within
SEQRA's zone of interests. Even a city was held to be without
standing to challenge approval of a hot mix asphalt plant in an
adjoining municipality.
On the other hand, decisions from three of the appellate divisions
reversed lower court decisions that had held that very close
neighbors of proposed facilities lacked standing to sue under
SEQRA.
Type II Exemptions
SEQRA and its regulations contain several exemptions and "Type
II" actions -- actions that have been determined never to have
sufficient environmental impact to require an EIS. Invocation of
these provisions succeeded in five of the six cases where it was
tried last year. The Type II categories for maintenance or repair of
existing structures and replacement, rehabilitation or
reconstruction of an existing structure shielded from SEQRA
review the renovation of a playground, replacement of sewer lines,
and widening of an airport runway. Other exemptions removed
from SEQRA review the issuance of a Landmarks Preservation
Commission approval for alterations to a building in an historic
district, the restructuring of the Long Island Lighting Company,

and an advisory opinion of the State Commissioner of Agriculture
and Markets.
The only case where this argument failed was Metropolitan
Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York , which concerned a new
City regulation that allowed certain vans and other non-medallion
vehicles to accept street hails in Manhattan and to pick up and
discharge passengers at Kennedy and LaGuardia airports. The
court rejected the City's argument that this new rule was necessary
to address an emergency (which would have put it within another
exemption); instead, the court declared, the rule should have been
reviewed under SEQRA before its adoption.
Plaintiffs' Victories
Environmental and community groups won three victories in 1998
-- all because no EIS had been prepared, or it was prepared too late.
Riverhead Business Improvement District v. Stark concerned a
zoning amendment that would have allowed large commercial
development; Riverkeeper, Inc. v. General Electric concerned a
hangar for private jets at the Westchester County Airport.
An EIS was prepared, but too late, in Vitiello v. City of Yonkers .
The City had changed the zoning of a site to allow the construction
of a cement plant. Two months later the City adopted a negative
declaration under SEQRA. The SEQRA action should have come
before the rezoning; the Appellate Division found that the "City
Council's attempted after-the-fact compliance was thus an empty
exercise, which in effect rubber-stamped a decision that had
already been made." The cement plant had already been completed
by the time the appellate decision was issued, but since the
plaintiffs had moved for a preliminary injunction when they first
filed the suit, "the plaintiffs did all they could do to timely
safeguard their interests, and [the cement company] was put on
notice that if it proceeded with construction, it would be at its own
risk." Therefore, the court ruled, the case was not considered moot,
and the case was remitted to the trial court for determination of
appropriate relief.
Defendants' Victories
Two decisions (in addition to those already discussed) where
defendants won merit mention. Both involved reversals by the
Appellate Division, Third Department, of decisions below. In West
Village Committee Inc. v. Zagata , the Appellate Division reversed
a lower court decision that had struck down certain amendments
to DEC's regulations under SEQRA. The lower court had found it
impermissible to exempt the Governor from SEQRA, and to add to
the Type II list certain non-residential projects and the
construction of one-, two- and three-family residences. The
Appellate Division found the revised regulations to be entirely
valid.

Finally, in Concerned Citizens for the Environment v. Zagata , the
Appellate Division found that no impermissible segmentation had
occurred when DEC had approved a solid waste transfer station
without analyzing as well the impacts of a materials recovery
facility and incinerator that had been proposed for the same site,
where the transfer station had undergone a full EIS and had
independent utility from the other proposed facilities.
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